Buffalo Law Review
Volume 3

Number 2

Article 17

4-1-1954

Income Tax—Exercise of Employee’s Stock Options
Jules Gordon

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Taxation-Federal Commons

Recommended Citation
Jules Gordon, Income Tax—Exercise of Employee’s Stock Options, 3 Buff. L. Rev. 321 (1954).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol3/iss2/17

This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @
University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized
editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

RECENT DECISIONS
Code § 24 (a). The court states that the presumption can only be
overcome by detailed evidence that each expenditure is different
from, or in excess of, the amount the taxpayer would otherwise
spend for his own personal purposes. Therefore if the taxpayer
is able to show that the portion of an expenditure for entertainment which he has spent for himself is in excess of his normal
personal expenditures, the difference between what was spent and
what he would have normally spent will be deductible.
The court sets a standard by which it ascertains the incidental
benefit which an individual receives from a business expenditure,
and declares that part to be a personal expense because of the
fact that the taxpayers participates in, and benefits from, the activity for which the expenditure is incurred and is not in excess of
his usual personal expenditure. This is in addition to the burden
the taxpayer has always had, i. e., showing that the reason for the
expenditure was to directly benefit his business. Although the
court in the instant case speaks only of food and entertainment,
this new approach could logically be extended to all business expenses, a portion of which inures as an incidental benefit to the
taxpayer as a result of his participation in the incurring of such
expense. The basis for the apportionment is founded on the nondeductibility of personal expenditures under Int. Rev. Code § 24
(a). Application of this rule to business trips which result in
partial vacation to the taxpayer, and other similar types of expenditures is not beyond a strict application of this decision.
Rudolph F. De Fazio.
INCOME TAX

OF EYrLOYEE'S
STOCK OPTIONS

-EXERCISE

In August of 1945, at the same time that the taxpayer joined
his employer corporation, he received an option to purchase
shares of the corporation's stock at a price below the then market
value. The option was freely assignable and was not dependent
upon the continued employment of the taxpayer. The corporation
spoke of the option as "additional compensation for the current
year" (1945).
When the taxpayer exercised the option in 1946 and 1947 the
stock was selling at a much higher price. The Commissioner assessed a deficiency on the excess of the market value at the time
of exercise over the option price. Held, reversing the Tax Court:
No income accrued to the taxpayer by reason of the exercise of
the option in 1946 and 1947 since the only compensation intended
was in the grant of the option in 1945. McNamara v. Commissioner, 210 F. 2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Prior to 1945, judicial decisions on the taxibility of employee
stock option plans had depended on findings of fact as to whether
the grant of the option was intended as compensation or to give
the employee "a proprietary interest" in the corporation. Where
there was intention to "compensate" this was found to be in the
exercise of the option, with ordinary income accruing to the extent of the difference between the fair market value of the stock
at date of exercise and the option price. Albert Erskine, 26 B. T.
A. 147 (1932); Edward Connolly, 45 B. T. A. 374 (1941), aff'd,
135 F. 2d 64 (6th Cir. 1943). For the rationale of the proprietary
interest finding, see Delbert Geeseman, 38 B. T. A. 258 (1938).
Before the Geeseman case, supra, the Treasury Regulations
took the position that the difference between market value and
option price, if substantial, was ordinary income. T. D. 3435 11-1
Cum. BULL. 50 (1923). After that case the Regulations were
changed to the position that the difference, if substantial, would
be income only to the extent it was in the nature of compensation
for services. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22 (a)-I (1943).
In a 1945 case, the Supreme Court held that the excess of
market value at the date of exercise over the option price was
ordinary income where there was no spread between option and
market price when the option was granted and it was found that
the parties contemplated compensation to the taxpayer. Commisstoner v. Smith, 324 U. S. 177 (1945). Dictum in the Smith case
suggested that were there a spread at the time the option was
granted so that the option itself had a present marketable value,
the option might be found to be the only compensation intended.
supra at 179.
Despite this dictum, shortly after the Smith decision the
Treasury amended its Regulations in T. D. 5507, 1946-1 Cum.
Bul. 18, which provided that if property is transferred by an
employer to an employee for an amount less than its fair market
value, the difference is in the nature of compensation. At the
same time the Treasury issued I. T. 3795, 1946-1 Cum. BuL.
15 which provided that:
[I]f an employee receives an option on or after Feb. 26,
1945 (the date of the Smith decision) to purchase stock of an
employer corporation, . . . and he exercises such option, [he]
realizes . . . income . . . on the date . . . he receives the
stock to the extent of the difference between the fair market
value of the stock when received and the price paid therefor.
If the employee transfers such option for consideration.
[he] realizes taxable income by way of compensation on the
date he receives such consideration to the extent of the value of
the consideration. (Emphasis added.)
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The scope of this last section of I. T. 3795 was severely restricted in a subsequent case where the taxpaper purchased stock
options from his employer corporation and later sold them at a
profit. The Tax Court, relying on the dictum in the Smith case,
held that the spread between the sale and purchase price of the
options was not ordinary income and that I. T. 3795 did not
apply. Lauson Stone, 19 T. C. 872 (1953), aff'd, 210 F. 2d 33
(1954).
Although in the instant case the employee exercised, rather
than sold the options, which he received in connection with an employment contract rather than by purchase, the court reached the
same result as in the Stone case, supra. The court here relies
heavily on the manifest intent of the corporation that the option
be considered compensation for the year in which it was granted,
and the finding that the option could have been sold for a substantial sum in the year of its receipt.
By holding that, despite the subsequent exercise, the value
of the option at the time of grant was the only compensation involved, the McNamara case has now completely vitiated I. T. 3795,
supra, and its rigid objective criteria.
Since the court did find that the grant of the option was intended to be compensation, T. D. 5507 is not yet squarely controverted if the option, rather than the stock purchased pursuant to
However, there
it be considered the "property transferred."
seems to be little doubt that the courts have not departed from
their position that what is compensation under the code is determined by the action and intention of the parties and not by TreasJues Gordon
ury Regulations.

LNT ERPLEADER- TEST OF MUTUALLY
EXCLUSIVE CLAIMS
A and B are brokers. In an action by A to recover commissions from vendor, B was interpleaded. In the contract of sale
between vendor and purchaser, the latter designated B as procuring broker and agreed to deliver to vendor an agreement indemnifying him against loss by reason of any claim by any other
broker for commissions. Simultaneously, another agreement was
made between vendor and B reciting the contents of the above
contract and stating that vendor was to pay $90,000 to B. Held
(4-1): B can rest on his agreement with vendor; A's claim for commissions earned is not affected thereby; therefore, interpleader
should not have been granted. Norman v. Oakland Golf Club, 282
App. Div. 960, 125 N. Y. S. 2d 859 (2d Dep't 1953).

